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T

he United States is at a transition point nearly unparalleled in its history.
Years of war abroad have severely strained America’s military, and the
ongoing economic crisis will force ever-greater constraints on all forms of
discretionary spending. Rising regional powers, energy scarcity, climate
change, and failing states are some of the myriad variables that will combine
to form a daunting set of strategic challenges for the Obama Administration.
Not since the late 1940s has America’s defense community faced challenges
of such size and scope. Unlike the immediate aftermath of the strategic shocks
of Pearl Harbor and 9/11—when the imperatives of war demanded a focus on
near-term requirements—the years following such fundamental disruptions
to America’s strategic context offer valuable opportunities and time to
reflect on what has changed, reset defense priorities, and renew US strategy
for the long term. Then as now, as the fog of uncertainty associated with the
emergence of a new geostrategic era begins to dissipate, the contours of the
strategic environment can be more clearly perceived.
As the fog lifts it becomes apparent that despite valiant efforts and
good intentions, America suffers from strategic distraction, dislocation, and
near-exhaustion. The United States is, as Army Chief of Staff General
George Casey and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen
often observe, “out of balance.” America’s defense posture today assumes far
more strategic risk than is prudent and rests on a shifting global foundation
certain to exacerbate the constraints and risks to US power and prestige.
The defense community is not as prepared as it should be for the challenges
of today and tomorrow—it can, and must, do better.
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Strategy is the art of connecting aspirations with prudent plans and
finite resources. This article will attempt to diagnose a troubling strategic
inheritance, describe a changing geopolitical context, and advocate a defense
strategy that can best protect core American interests in an age of transition.
A Troubled Inheritance
By almost any measure, President Barack Obama faces a daunting
national security inheritance. Even before the onset of the current economic
crisis, a series of imposing challenges—from wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq to an exploding national debt at home—promised to force the new
administration to make hard choices among competing priorities. In the
context of the most dramatic economic storm since the Great Depression,
such choices and tradeoffs are now not only necessary but imperative.
The Obama Administration is accepting a troubled inheritance on three
dimensions of American power: military, diplomatic, and economic.
The most pressing challenge for the new Pentagon team will be
countering dramatic constraints on America’s freedom of action around
the globe. With the preponderance of US ground forces either en route to,
deployed in, or returning from commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
ability to react to any consequential strategic surprise is seriously curtailed.
Admiral Mullen’s guidance for 2008-2009 paints an ominous picture: “The
pace of ongoing operations has prevented our forces from training for the
full-spectrum of operations and impacts our ability to be ready to counter
future threats. This lack of balance is unsustainable in the long term.”1 The
challenge for Pentagon leaders will be to find ways to generate options
for a new President within an operational environment that fundamentally
limits what American forces can do and how they might react to unexpected
contingencies. Moreover, almost every outside study examining the
Pentagon’s procurement and acquisition programs has concluded that
the system is broken. “It may be hard for most people to believe that our
defense establishment is in a serious decline,” argued former procurement
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official John Christie in a recent issue of Proceedings, but he was correct
to conclude that unless major changes are made soon, “US defense forces
will continue to shrink and age, and we rapidly will cease being a dominant
military force in the world.”2
The new administration also inherited nonmilitary instruments of
statecraft that are struggling to rejuvenate an expeditionary ethos and
capability that became seriously atrophied in the post-Cold War era.
Despite a notable increase in funding for the State Department in recent
years, resources and capabilities for diplomacy, foreign assistance, field
development, and public diplomacy remain a fraction of what they should
be. It is not in America’s interest to constantly depend on its military to
provide, in some instances, all the elements of statecraft.3 Indeed, in his
current guidance for the joint force, Admiral Mullen warns that “we must
guard against the further militarization of our foreign policy.”4 During the
Cold War, US leaders understood the necessity of using all elements of
national power to counter an adversary who practiced ideological warfare.
The future will require the United States to be adept not only in countering
extremist strategies, but also those of rising autocratic powers, emboldened
by the current economic crisis and likely to challenge western liberal economic
models in ways not seen for decades.5 Moreover, America’s image abroad
has significantly eroded in recent years, making it difficult to persuade
international partners and allies to continue their participation in ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and hampering the ability of US
diplomats to make progress on key international issues.6
Finally, the scale and scope of America’s economic woes will provide
the immediate context within which the new administration will need to
balance competing domestic and international priorities. The economic
backdrop is sobering. America’s national debt, accumulated over decades,
totaled $5.7 trillion in early 2001. When President Obama took the oath of
office, the national debt exceeded $10 trillion, or approximately $90,000
per US household.7 The challenge of arresting the current economic decline
in the face of what is likely to be a 2009 budget deficit of at least $1 trillion,
or nearly seven percent of gross domestic product, is difficult to overstate.8
The crisis within America’s financial services sector, the ongoing mortgage
and foreclosure challenges, and the potential for a continuing recession will
all combine to force the new administration to make hard choices concerning
where and how to balance strategic risk.
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The Third Turning
In addition to inheriting this troubled national security environment,
the Obama Administration will have to come to grips with an international
system that is undergoing fundamental changes not seen since the end of
the Cold War. Simply reacting to the challenges of the present without
contemplating the deeper and more fundamental forces that are forming the
contours of the future is perhaps the largest strategic risk facing those charged
with crafting US national security and defense strategy. It is precisely when
the demands of the present seem overwhelming that the need to consider
America’s strategic position in the larger context of history is most urgent.
During the last century there have been only two fundamental shifts,
or turns, affecting the foundation of the international system. These turns
are short periods that set the stage for events and conditions that occur in
the succeeding years. The first turn involved the shift away from a world
of competing great powers before the Second World War toward a global
environment defined by the contest between the United States and the
Soviet Union. This first turn, roughly between the end of the war in 1945
and the first successful Soviet atomic test in 1949, not only altered the
basic framework of the international system but essentially defined in fairly
precise terms the requirements for American grand strategy and defense
policy. In 1950, as the nature of the emerging strategic environment became
increasingly clear, the planning document NSC 68 outlined what would
become America’s decades-long Cold War strategy. NSC 68 provided a
two-pronged approach: “One is a policy which we would probably pursue
even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a
healthy international community. The other is the policy of ‘containing’ the
Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact on one
another.”9 By sustaining a global system that was inherently advantageous
to American and allied interests while simultaneously containing the worst
of what George Kennan called “Russia’s expansionist tendencies,” the Cold
War ultimately concluded in the West’s favor.10
The period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 1991 Gulf
War constitutes the second turn. The bipolar standoff that defined 40 years
of the Cold War was replaced by a unipolar world in which the United
States enjoyed unrivaled freedom of action. Following the second turn,
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America stood alone for more than a decade as a global sheriff, using its
power to advance a uniquely western vision while attempting to rein in the
darker aspects of globalization, such as anarchy and terrorism. Unipolarity
came at a cost, however, as the lonely challenge of global leadership proved
a thankless task. The Clinton Administration struggled to define a grand
strategy in the absence of a single overarching external threat, and, consumed
by the consequences of the Soviet Union’s devolution, spent much of the
decade dealing with critical issues such as securing the nuclear arsenals
of newly free East European states, helping adapt Cold War-era alliances
to a new era, and reacting to ethnic conflict in Africa and the Balkans.
Military operations during this period, including humanitarian and stability
operations in Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean, proved to be harbingers of
future challenges.
The world is currently undergoing another large shift in the international system. The attacks of 11 September 2001 and America’s 2003
invasion of Iraq arguably marked the beginning, or an acceleration, of a
third turn in the global strategic context. The notion of a third turn, recently
endorsed by the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025
report, is the result of the slow and gradual shift from a unipolar to a complex
multipolar world. On nearly every dimension of power, from percentage of
global military spending, to gross domestic product, to the persuasive power
of its political and economic system, the United States will begin to lose
its dominant relative advantage. “The international system—as constructed
following the Second World War—will be almost unrecognizable by 2025,”
the National Intelligence Council report concludes, “owing to the rise of
emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative
wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence
of nonstate actors.”11 Along with the rise of new great powers such as China
and India, the future is likely to see increased conflict driven by climate
change, resource scarcity, and the continued proliferation of nuclear
technology. This geopolitical turn is not complete nor is it fully understood,
but that it has begun is undeniable. The core undertaking for the Obama
Administration will be to address the challenges of today while preparing
the United States to adapt to a world in which power is more diffuse and
sources of danger more distributed.
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An Evolving Environment
The ongoing shift to a multipolar world characterized by increasingly
powerful state and nonstate actors is already impacting the operational
environment for America’s joint force. Beyond the imperative to achieve
sustainable stability in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the broader operational
challenges associated with likely twenty-first century threats are as daunting
as the strategic inheritance. There are three core challenges likely to pose
increasing difficulties for American military forces over the mid- to longrange future: developing tensions in the global commons, the rise of hybrid
forms of warfare, and the persistent need to assist important weak states.
First, the United States’ dependence on free and fair access to a
vibrant global economy requires stability in the global commons, those
areas that no single nation controls but that provide access and connectivity
to much of the world.12 Ninety percent of global trade travels by sea, and all
advanced nations are at least somewhat reliant on a global communications
system comprised of Internet servers and orbiting satellites. Since World
War II, the United States essentially has been the guarantor of the global
commons, ensuring freedom of the seas and the ability of individuals to
traverse much of the world. This extended era of uncontested dominance
of the global commons may be coming to an end. A recent string of highprofile examples—including China’s successful antisatellite missile test
and spacewalk; India’s unmanned lunar mission and augmented naval
capability; Russia’s naval and air posturing in the evolving Arctic region; the
rise in offensive cyberspace operations; and recurring piracy in key littoral
environments—all point to a future where the United States will confront
increased tension and complexity throughout the global commons. The
2008 National Defense Strategy reflects this insight, stating that “the United
States requires freedom of action in the global commons and strategic access
to important regions of the world to meet our national security needs.”13
Second, future adversaries are likely to challenge America’s strategic
interests by utilizing perceived asymmetric advantages at both ends of the
conflict spectrum. The 2007 US maritime strategy observed that modern
“conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and
irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and nonstate
actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative
ways.”14 America’s continued strength in major force-on-force conflict will
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incentivize future adversaries toward distributed cellular forms of insurgency
characterized by the improvised explosive devices and ambushes seen in
Iraq and Afghanistan, or toward the use of organized small-unit kinetic
operations buttressed with employment of advanced technology such as the
antitank and antiship munitions successfully employed by Hezbollah in the
2006 Lebanon War. Indeed, an influential study of Hezbollah’s performance
in 2006 concluded that while ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
require US forces to adapt to more traditional forms of insurgent warfare,
“Hezbollah does demonstrate, unambiguously, that even today’s nonstate
actors are not limited to the irregular, guerrilla model military methods so
often assumed in the future warfare debate.”15 A future that includes hybrid
warfare will demand that the joint force be proficient across the entire
spectrum of conflict, and the development of such proficiency will be a
central task for military and civilian leaders.16
Finally, given the certainty of continued global economic and
resource challenges, future conflicts will likely occur in chronically weak or
failing states. The frequency and severity of security issues associated with
the erosion of national control in failing states will continue to increase.
Moreover, the rise of new regional and great powers will increase the
prospects that neighboring nations will either reap the benefits of expanding
trade or suffer the consequences of population movements and disruptions to
traditional economic and cultural patterns. Many governments will not have
the option of choosing their fate in this regard. The increasing frequency of
state failure or chronic governance shortfalls will pose two major problems
for the United States. First, weak nations have proven to be catalysts for
the growth of extremism and occasionally provide sanctuary to dangerous
nonstate actors. Second, US interests will require that some countries, those
that possess nuclear weapons or vital resources, either be protected from
failure or stabilized in a post-failure scenario by American and allied military
forces. Such intervention, ranging from military advising and training to
counterinsurgency and stability operations, is often inconclusive, does not
play to America’s strengths, and yet is likely to remain a fixture of the future
international security environment.
Grand Strategy in Transition
Having provided an overview of the ongoing changes in the
international system and some key features of the future operational
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environment, the question of grand strategy can be addressed. The United
States has many interests and faces a number of threats, but troubled
economic times and ongoing conflicts will require the new administration
to articulate a principled rationale for the maintenance and exercise of
American power.
It is first necessary to contemplate those instances where the previous
administration may have failed to sufficiently appreciate what the emerging
strategic environment required. For years, progress in Iraq and Afghanistan
was hampered by a stubborn adherence to the goal of achieving maximalist
end-states that caused or exacerbated a host of strategic errors—from
the dismantlement of the Iraqi Army in 2003 to the continued belief that
building an effective central government in Kabul was a reasonable and
low-cost proposition. At the same time, the conclusion reached early in the
Bush Administration that America did not need to embrace key international
partners and allies proved to be a dramatic constraint on its ability to forge
consensus on issues ranging from climate change to nonproliferation. In the
modern era, a minimalist view of what international institutions and alliances
have to offer erodes rather than reinforces American power and influence.
Leadership shown by both former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in recent years has ameliorated some
of the damage, but as Richard Haass notes, because of “what it has done and
what it has failed to do, the United States has accelerated the emergence of
alternative power centers in the world and has weakened its own position
relative to them.”17
At the same time, however, to paraphrase Mark Twain, the rumors of
America’s demise tend to be exaggerated. The United States will remain a
powerful nation well into the future. America’s relatively liberal immigration
policies and a culture of tolerance will help ameliorate the effects of aging
populations that strain much of the rest of the world, while the US economy
will remain an effective engine for growth provided that investments in
infrastructure, education, and cutting-edge research and innovation continue
during this economic downturn. Fareed Zakaria correctly comments that
despite the emergence of what he terms the “post-American world,” the
United States will “remain a vital, vibrant economy, at the forefront of the
next revolution in science, technology, and industry.”18
If America is to ease the transition into its role as a critically important
actor in a twenty-first century international system defined by the emergence
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of new powers, the United States needs to embrace its central role in
sustaining an international system that can accommodate them. A truly
grand strategy for America would be one that recognizes that the future
of US power is coterminous with the fate of the international system the
United States spent decades building and reinforcing during the Cold War.
Successfully containing the Soviet Union is only one part of America’s proud
Cold War legacy; constructing and then sustaining the very foundations of
the international system is arguably the more important component, one
that tends to be overlooked. “Far from justifying a radical change in policy,”
James Steinberg argues, “the evolution of the international system since the
collapse of the Soviet Union actually reinforced the validity of the liberal
internationalist approach.”19 Moreover, the insight that NSC 68 provided in
1950 is just as relevant today: “In a world of polarized power, the policies
designed to develop a healthy international community are more than ever
necessary to our own strength.”20
A grand strategy of sustainment would shift the emphasis of US
policy toward the long-term objective of ensuring that the fabric of the global
system is not only strong enough to endure twenty-first century challenges,
but that it evolves and adapts in ways favorable to American interests. For
example, a key strategic issue for the United States will be to help ensure
that the rise of new great powers will not cause conflict that puts the status
of the global commons in jeopardy. Emerging naval powers such as China
and India have great aspirations and global interests. Making certain that
the world’s oceans and important littoral environments remain conducive
to unfettered trade and travel is vital. Likewise, ensuring that space and
cyberspace can be peacefully utilized by all who desire to communicate and
conduct legitimate commerce will be essential. The preservation of peace
and stability in the global commons is no small task and can no longer be
taken for granted in a century that will witness dramatic structural change.
The hard and soft power tasks associated with this challenge are immense,
undergirding all of America’s choices and aspirations in a changing world.
Alongside a renewed focus on stability within the global commons
should be the realization that in a world system undergoing profound
change, there will be some shocks and discontinuities that will increase the
pace of decline and severity of problems associated with weak and failing
nations. It is in the interest of the United States to take an active role in aiding
critical nations to endure difficult external and internal pressures. American

Winter 2008-09					

35

interests are intimately affected, for example, if Pakistan or North Korea
were to experience state failure. Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Iraq are other
countries where instability or civil war would threaten US interests. While
America cannot and should not guarantee the survival of weak regimes in
important regions, particularly if the governments are autocratic in nature,
policymakers need to understand that robust development, economic, and
military assistance missions will be a critical element of a grand strategy
designed to sustain the twenty-first century international system.
America’s Defense Priorities
A changing international system and operating environment coupled
with a requisite shift in American grand strategy will have important
implications for the Department of Defense (DOD). It should be noted,
however, that of all the major national security institutions, DOD has done
the best job in adapting to the changing global environment. It is during
times of war that innovation cycles tend to shorten and improve, and this
has surely been the case at the Pentagon. It is time, however, to step back
and assess how DOD can best shift priorities to prepare for the future.
At the strategic level, the Pentagon and the military services have
been relatively successful in perceiving how the future security environment
will impact strategic and operational requirements for the US defense
establishment. From a maritime strategy which recognizes that future
adversaries are likely to employ hybrid forms of warfare, to innovative
Army doctrine such as Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and
FM 3-07, Stability Operations, the services have recognized several of the
key characteristics that will drive future defense priorities. Moreover, the
2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) impressively articulated a nuanced
understanding of the need to devote attention to issues encompassing the
global commons, energy security, and building capacity with partners and
allies. Perhaps most importantly, the NDS addressed the imperative of
balancing risk in several dimensions, an issue that will be central in an era
of economic strain.21
All too often, however, innovation and strategic clarity at the service
level or emerging doctrine fail to translate into clear resource shifts. For
example, while the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called for increased
investment in unmanned aerial vehicles, Secretary Gates acknowledged his

36								

Parameters

frustration in April 2008 when he publicly criticized the slow pace of change
during a speech to students at the Air War College: “I’ve been wrestling for
months to get more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets
into the theater. Because people were stuck in old ways of doing business,
it’s been like pulling teeth.”22 All services have shortcomings related to how
effectively and quickly they can adapt to new requirements, and while this
is not always indicative of resistance to change, the military collectively can
do better in preparing for the future.
For the Navy, the near- to mid-term future will require the maximum
possible capability to conduct littoral operations. The dramatic increase in
piracy targeting merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden highlights the need for
more capacity to patrol and protect key shipping lanes and chokepoints.
The new Littoral Combat Ship, with its speed, maneuverability, and shallow
draft, will be a useful addition to the fleet. Also, the Navy needs to make
preparations for a future in which carrier-based unmanned combat aerial
vehicles constitute a fairly high percentage of aviation assets. The range
and persistence that Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) platforms
will provide would dramatically increase the capacity of aircraft carriers
to support a wide range of surveillance and combat requirements across a
variety of missions. Especially in light of the development of new threats
such as hypersonic cruise missiles, it only makes sense that the Navy embrace
technologies enabling increased capacity to support ground operations from
farther offshore.23 The impressive performance of the Navy’s Aegis missile
system during the 2008 launch to destroy a failing US satellite demonstrated
that the Navy can and will continue to play a critical role in providing a variety
of missile-defense capabilities. Finally, the Navy should continue to enhance
capabilities that hedge against a future in which America’s adversaries
employ anti-access and sea-denial strategies utilizing advanced technology.
Future priorities for the Air Force are likely to remain enhancing
capabilities that increase mobility, persistence, and precision. While the
Air Force has suffered something of an identity crisis in recent years, the
fact remains that it plays an indispensible role in ensuring that the joint
force can see, move, and strike. Near- to mid-term priorities for the Air
Force will continue to focus on ensuring that the service can acquire new
airlift and refueling platforms, while substantially increasing investment in
unmanned aerial systems. The current operating environment demonstrates
that sustained ground operations are likely to last far longer than initial
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estimates, requiring the ability to support forward-deployed forces for longduration missions. Like the Navy, the Air Force should consider significant
investment in UCAS technology, as the future will demand platforms that
can loiter for long periods over extended distances. Given budget pressures,
the Air Force should consider taking more risk in its short-range tactical
fighter programs, including limiting F-22A Raptor procurement to 183
planes and slowing the production rate of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.24
Finally, given the increased importance of building the capacity of foreign
militaries, the Air Force would be wise to invest in simpler, lower cost
platforms for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and combat air
support such as the propeller-driven RC-12 or a new light-attack aircraft
(OA-X). Use of these platforms will help build partner capacity at a fraction
of the cost of more advanced and largely unnecessary systems.25
America’s ground forces will continue to be stretched beyond what
is prudent given the limitations of the all-volunteer force. The nation is
taking unacceptable risk by having such a large percentage of its ground
forces deployed and unable to respond to unexpected situations. The Army
appears to be on track to increase its end-strength to 547,000 soldiers, and
the Marine Corps will soon complete its expansion to 202,000 Marines.
These increases were necessary given the continued strain operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan pose in the near- to mid-term. Proposals to further
increase ground force size should be closely scrutinized, however, in favor
of ensuring that each service first gets the shape of the force correct. For
example, even with an increased end-strength, the Army remains wedded
to fielding a number of heavy brigades outfitted with the Future Combat
System (FCS), the Army’s largest vehicle modernization program with
a price tag of at least $160 billion.26 FCS is a risky modernization effort,
considering that many of the technologies remain unproven. In 2008, the
Government Accountability Office concluded that “it is not clear if or when
the information network that is at the heart of the FCS concept can be
developed, built, and demonstrated.”27 Although the Army is wise to focus
on ensuring that brigades are capable of operating across the spectrum of
operations, given fiscal constraints it may be prudent to take some additional
risk and add training and equipment geared more toward irregular warfare
and stability operations.
For the US Marine Corps and special operations forces, the biggest
issues relate to the possibility that current operations are causing traditional
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skill-sets to atrophy. For example, Marine Corps Commandant General James
T. Conway is correct to voice concern that sustained ground operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan are eroding the Corps’ ability to disembark ground
forces from the sea, a key capability required in an environment where the
ability to conduct complex expeditionary operations in urbanized littoral
environments is likely.28 This capability will require equipment and concepts
of operations that enable Marine Air-Ground Task Forces to project and
sustain combat power ashore in the face of an increasingly lethal antiship
missile threat. While US special operations forces are experiencing a period
of historic expansion, there are a number of strategists who are concerned that
capabilities geared toward the indirect approach—unconventional warfare,
foreign internal defense, civil affairs, and psychological operations—are
relatively under-resourced and under-utilized.29 The ability to recruit, train,
and retain highly skilled soldiers with critical language skills and cultural
expertise is vital if the United States is to succeed in the irregular warfare
missions likely to drive future demand.
Finally, the emerging domains of space and cyberspace should be
among the top priorities for the new administration’s leadership. According
to a report issued by the Council on Foreign Relations, China’s antisatellite
missile test in 2007 created the largest manmade debris field in space and
heralded “the arrival of an era where space is a potentially far more contested
domain than in the past, with few rules.”30 The US Strategic Command
operates the Joint Functional Component Command for Space and is
the coordinating authority for all US military space assets, charged with
developing concepts of operations for ensuring that America can protect its
ability to freely operate in space.31 As rising powers attempt to field spacebased assets, national leadership should provide not only the right guidance
to the US military for strategy and capability development, but also pursue
the direct diplomacy necessary to reduce the possibility of conflict in space.
Similarly, in cyberspace the frequency and severity of cyber attacks has
increased, with Russia and China showing clear progress and determination
to pursue robust offensive cyber capabilities.32 There is a pressing need to
develop offensive as well as defensive capabilities to ensure that the United
States can protect its vital Internet-based infrastructure while placing an
adversary’s assets at risk.
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Strategic Reviews
A changing international system coupled with a rapidly evolving
operating environment requires that the Department of Defense make hard
choices and assume the risk necessary to prepare for the future. Several
impending constraints and mandatory reviews will present challenges as well
as opportunities to ensure that America’s military remains properly postured
and prepared. There are several ways the Pentagon’s civilian leadership can
act as responsible stewards during the first year of the new administration.
First and most obvious, the years of unrestrained defense spending
increases are expected to come to an end; the ongoing economic crisis will
demand hard choices regarding the allocation of increasingly finite defense
dollars. This is not a new phenomenon, as NSC 68 argued in 1950 that “free
society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends.”33 The military
will need to come to the table with options for policymakers concerning
how best to retain core capabilities while being frank in assessing the need
to assume risk in other areas.34 Budget and program reviews for fiscal year
2010 as well as the out-years in the defense plan should be utilized to get
the defense budget back on track in what will almost certainly be an era of
fiscal restraint.
Second, both the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the
Nuclear Posture Review are processes, almost a year in length, that should
be used to shape DOD’s strategy and investment portfolio. These reviews
should also be utilized to help influence and shape the next National
Security Strategy document and other interagency reviews. During a period
of systemic change in the international environment, policymakers at the
White House, on Capitol Hill, and throughout government agencies need
to be aware of how DOD views the future, to include any challenges and
constraints. At the Pentagon, in order for the QDR to be successful, senior
leaders need to take an active role ensuring that the process is not only
strategy driven, but also resource constrained. The leadership needs to guard
against the QDR devolving into a thinly veiled competition for resources.
Finally, as part of the QDR, a force-planning construct should be
developed that clearly delineates what is expected of US military forces
related to homeland defense; major force-on-force conflicts that include
regime change; stability and reconstruction operations; persistent foreign
internal defense; and protecting American interests throughout the global
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commons. Recent conflicts have called into question the long-standing
requirement for the US military to plan for two nearly simultaneous major
combat operations of the type required for regime change in the Middle
East or East Asia.35 A new force-planning construct needs to acknowledge
that military forces, particularly ground forces, are far less fungible than
previous QDRs assumed. Put another way, a new force-planning construct
cannot assert that forces deployed as part of long-term, steady-state advising
or partnering missions will be able to be reset and shift rapidly to major
combat operations.
The Great Task
After more than seven years of combating global terrorism, the
contours of the future security environment are becoming increasingly clear.
The international system is beginning to undergo a fundamental shift—a third
turning—away from a unipolar world order toward one characterized by the
presence of several great powers and increasingly powerful nonstate actors.
The future operating environment will feature an increase in hybrid forms of
warfare as well as increasing tensions throughout the global commons. Such
a future requires America to employ a grand strategy focused on sustaining
a global system capable of accommodating these profound changes, which
requires the US military to invest in capabilities that can concurrently
address hybrid challenges and conflict in the commons, while maintaining
an ability to work by, with, and through allies and partners. All these tasks
need to be accomplished while ensuring that the foundations of America’s
economy remain sound. Crafting a defense strategy that can overcome the
challenges of today while preparing for tomorrow will be a difficult and
onerous task, but America’s defense community has risen to the challenge
before, and there is little reason to doubt that it can do so again.
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